The October 2, 2010 issue of The New Scientist features an article called ‘Countdown to Oblivion,’ which explains the research of physicist Ben Freivogel and his team at UC Berkeley. Freivogel and colleague Raphael Buosso work on theories of eternal inflation, best (over)simplified as the notion that ‘different parts of space can undergo dramatic growth spurts, essentially ballooning into separate universes with their own physical properties.’ Further, ‘the process happens an infinite number of times, creating an infinite number of universes, called the multiverse’ (quoted from the article).
As the article explains, ‘the infinities involved mean that anything that can happen does happen—an infinite number of times,’ such that defining probabilities according to our typical means of doing so becomes hugely problematic. Accordingly, physicists take a slice—a ‘cut-off’—of the multiverse as a sample; ‘however, doing this inevitably slices through individual universes on the edge of the sample,’ leading to flawed probabilities…
…UNLESS (!), as Freivogel contends, ‘the mathematical cut-offs somehow have real and dire consequences for the places they intersect.’
In other words, as PMB understands it, the argument here is that because of an inexplicable hitch in a self-sealing mathematical method of making ‘cosmological predictions,’ the physicists involved are prepared to assume not that their method of understanding the cosmos is limited, but that a mathematical aporia can actually manifest itself in the physical destruction of the universe and the end of time.
The most striking quotes come from the scientists who are trying to negotiate the problem:
“‘We’re stuck between a rock and a hard place,’ says Buosso, ‘if you don’t like the cut-off, then you have no way of making predictions and deciding what’s possible in eternal inflation.’”
If you 'don't like' the cut-off?!?
PMB translation: if it doesn’t make sense to you how the existence of a mathematical problem can not merely signify, but actively create the destruction of the universe, then it may be better to just pretend like this is the case so that we can continue to run our simulations, unfettered.
And then:
“‘If we do have the end of time, then that’s a strange situation, but at least it solves this paradox,’ says Olum.’”
PMB translation: look, since solving this paradox is obviously more important to us than the continuation of time, we’re happy to accept this theory as soon as we can find a way to prove it.
PMB isn’t interested in commenting on the validity of Freivogel’s research or the solution to this paradox, nor is he qualified to do so. He flagged this article as an excellent example of how the supercilious Cult of Doing Science can actually undermine good scientific thinking. These physicists openly admit that their properly derived doubt about their conclusions is directly affected by the fact that such doubt could undermine the very method by which they do their work. Here what the public is led to believe is 'scientific,' hence bulletproof, by the Cult of Doing Science, is actually a good representation of much of what doing science actually entails: speculation, assumption, doubt, failure, readjustment.
(And before the scientists find a way to get self-righteous about this portrayal of science as rather difficult work, let PMB remind you that science disciplines aren't the only ones who experience this amid the rigors of their work; same is true for everyone else).
The real rock and hard place are these: if the scientific community focuses on doing good science above its pursuit of monopolizing knowledge itself, it will necessarily have to open up the public to the same kinds of doubts about science that any scientist faces every day; and if it opens up the public to that truth, the public may cease to drink the kool aid.
Jean Baudrillard, representative par excellence of the sort of literary and cultural theory that famed physicist Alan Sokal pilloried in 1996, argued in Simulacra and Simulation (1981) that we've reached a point of references without referents, where simulations become the new reality, taking precedence over any perceived notion of the real.
Now PMB is starting to think that the cultural theorists are having the last laugh...
